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1. Introduction 
Despite the heated debate over the guns vs. butter 
issue, remarkably little empirical attention has been 
given to the socio-economic sources of national mili-
tary-industrial capabilities. The boom in the growth of 
arms industries began in the 1960s. By the end of that 
decade, a total of 27 third-world countries produced 
some equipment for their armed forces, usually small 
arms and ammunition (Evans 1986, p. 99). 
1980 some of the advanced weapons systems in 
these countries had reached the point where they 
were competing with the established arms suppli-
ers. At present, arms production in the third World 
is a bimodal system. Argentina, Brazil, Israel, India 
and South Africa possess the most advanced and 
diversified defense industries, involving the pro-
duction of a range of aircraft, armored vehicles, 
missiles and warships. A second emerging group 
includes Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, North Korea, 
the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan (Evans 
1986, p. 99). 
The motives for indigenous arms production in the 
third world have been traditionally dealt with in terms 
of political and or strategic ~onsiderations. As 
Michael Moodie (1979, p. 298) has observed: "Indi-
genous defense production is an expression of self-
reliance, and thus it is a means of reducing a state's 
vulnerability to military and political pressures during 
times of crisis". 
Increasingly, however, economic incentives (Wulf 
1985, p. 329) have acquired an independent impor-
tance in motivating third world countries to establish 
their own defense production facilities. 
Developing countries maintain that by manufac-
turing weapons systems indigenously, they can 
reduce the costs of these arms and save foreign 
exchange. Furthermore, if these products can be 
exported they are a potential source of foreign 
exchange earnings (Evans 1986, p. 100). 
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In fact Brazil is the classic example of a country 
which vigorously promotes arms exports and has a 
thriving indigenous military industry based partly 
on expanding exports. Other countries are follow-
ing the trend and there is little doubt that develop-
ing countries will increasingly compete in world 
markets to sell their armaments. An interesting 
new feature is the entry of transnational corpora-
tions in this field. The recent decisions by firms in 
Italy and Brazil to pool resources to produce strike 
fighters may simply be an early signal for many 
more such developments (Deger and Sen 1985, 
p. 2). 
While economic motives undoubtedly influence 
some third world countries to attempt arms produc-
tion, it is just as clear that not all countries in the deve-
loping world are able to profitably begin producing 
their own armaments (Alexander, Butz, and Mihalka 
1981;Ross 1981). RecentlyStephanieNeuman(l984, 
p. 181) has raised the question as to "why, for 
example, do some states produce arms while others 
do not? What explains why some producing states 
support large and diversified military industries, 
while others do not?" Neuman is in fact one of the few 
researchers1 who has attempted to determine the criti-
cal characteristics that set Third World arms produc-
ers2 apart from those countries who have not deve-
loped domestic defense industries. 
Neuman's (1984, p. 185) general hypothesis and 
results indicate that 
What emerges within the Third World from these 
data is a hierarchically shaped arms production sys-
tem based largely on factors of scale. In each region, 
the largest defense producers are generally also 
those countries with the biggest militaries and 
GNPs, which dwarf quantitatively, if not always 
qualitatively, the capabilities of their smaller, poor-
er neighbors. 
It should be noted that Neuman's results apply 
only in a general sort of way, and that there are numer-
ous smaller countries - Ecuador, Fiji, Peru, Sri Lanka 
and the Dominican Republic whose arms industries 
clearly cannot be explained simply in terms of their 
economic size or population base. · 
In short, what seems to come out of the discussion 
by Neuman and others is the hypothesis that military 
producers can be categorized by either size variables -
the overall gross national product, population, area, 
and so on - or military variables - armed forces, total 
military expenditures, or other measures of military 
allocation or some combination of size and military 
variables. 
While the unique factors characterizing Third 
World arms producers may be somewhat hazy, there 
is not doubt that their numbers have been increasing 
rapidly in the post-World War II period; the number of 
Third World producers of at least one major weapons 
system has increased from 5in1950to14in1959-69 
up to21in1969-70 and26by1979-80(Neuman1984, 
pp. 172-173). 
Not surprisingly, a number of commentators have 
specifically cited the proliferation of arms production 
facilities in the developing countries as a major contri-
buting factor to the disintegration of super power in-
fluence in the third world. For example: 
The indigenous weapons production phenomenon 
is one small dimension of a much larger develop-
ment, the diffusion of power throughout the inter-
national system. This has occurred in the economic 
and political realms as well as in the military. In 
each case, this has involved the erosion of the 
incredible concentrations of political, economic 
and military power in the hands of a small numbe; 
of large industrial states (Miller 1980, p. 25). 
The implications for armaments developments and 
disarmament efforts are manifold. More nations 
and producers are offering arms on the world mar-
ket. The structure of the supplier market has there-
fore been directly affected. Effective control of 
arms transfers is becoming increasingly difficult. 
Concerted supplier action to limit the transfer of 
arms seems ever more unlikely as the number of 
producers, and therefore potential exporters 
increases (Wulf 1985, p. 342). 
In this conception, interdependence is a zero-sum 
pie in which the individual slices are becoming more 
equal in size. Indigenous production capabilities, spe-
cifically in the area of military-production, become a 
symbol, not just of the growing self-sufficiency ofkey 
Third World producers, but the erosion of the traditi-
onal suppliers' influence as well. 
In short, the production of armaments for indigen-
ous use is one symptom of the diffusion of power in 
the international system (Gilpin 1981, p. 180). 
As technology becomes available to developing 
countries, traditional ties to the superpowers for milit-
ary support have become weaker. The underlying 
impetus is part of a growing international movement 
for political-military autonomy on the part of the 
Third World and a striving for economic self-suffici-
ency. This principle of reducing dependence applies 
to regions as well as countries, as appears to be the 
case in most of Latin America as a number of coun-
tries in that part of the world seek out alternatives to 
their economic ties to the northern hemisphere. 
Many of the Latin American countries decided to pro-
duce some of their own military weapons, and have 
been doing so for over 25 years (Table 1). 
Table 1. Latin American and Caribbean Producers of at Least One Major 
Country 1959 - 1960 1969 - 1970 1979 - 1980 
Argentina Light plane 'Ii'ainer All types 
Submarine 
Brazil Light plane Trainer All types 
Trainers Transport 
Chile Light trainer Tanker 
Colombia Patrol boat Light plane Light plane 
Submarine 
Dominican Republic Light craft Light craft Light plane 
Patrol boat 
Ecuador Corvette 
Mexico Patrol boat Patrol boat 
Peru Tanker Patrol boat Frigate tanker 
Venezuela Patrol boat 
Source: Stephanie G. Neuman, "International Stratification and Third World Military Industries" International 
Organization {Wmter 1984), Table 2, pp. 172-173. ' 
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The purpose of this article is to assess the likelihood 
that additional countries in Latin America will 
become arms producers in the foreseeable future. 
The present paper extents our earlier work (Looney 
and Frederiksen 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1987; Looney 
1987, 1988) which indicated that: 
1. for a large group of developing countries, external 
public borrowing has been used to accommodate 
increased levels of military expenditures and arms 
imports; 
2. given the external borrowing limits recently 
reached by a number of these countries, further 
military expenditures may result in lower rates of 
economic growth. Similarly debt constraints may 
serve to reduce the over-all levels of third world 
military expenditures; 
3. it is possible to profile with a high degree of proba-
bility, arms and non-arms producers in Latin Ame-
rica; 
4. the same appears to be the case for other parts of 
the world, although the factors setting the two 
groups of countries apart may be somewhat differ-
ent (Looney 1988); 
5. in general the non-producing countries have high 
debt service ratios relative to the countries that pro-
duce arms. This fact together with the generally 
unproductive nature of military expenditures, 
make it unlikely that this group of countries as a 
whole will be in a position to significantly expand 
military expenditures in the near future. 
2. Characteristics of Latin American Arms Producers 
More specifically, the main factors characterizing 
military and non-military producers in Latin America 
(Table 2) appear to be with respect to size, military 
activity, and access to foreign exchange, with the 
military producers being larger in terms of GNP, 
population and overall armed forces. They also 
appear to have greater access to foreign exchange as 
indicated by the relative size of their external public 
debt and growth (since 1970) in exports and imports. 
Table 2. Characteristics of Latin American Arms and Non Arms Producers 
Variable Means 
Total Producers Non Arms 
Variables Sample of Arms Producers 
Size Variables (1982) 
GNP Per Capita 1861.4 2092.2 1688.3 
Gross National Product 33961.9 72663.3 4935.8 
Population 17.1 34.9 3.7 
Area 65.6 1964.2 185.5 
Industrial Labor Force 401.8 838.2 74.4 
Labor Force 945.9 1941.5 199.3 
Military Variables (1981) 
Armed Forces 65.6 133.4 14.8 
Total Military Expenditures 571.2 1138.3 107.2 
Military Expenditures % GNP 2.1 2.1 2.1 
Military Expenditures Per Capita 39.7 47.8 32.9 
Economic Variables 
Public External Debt, 1980 743.5 1521.3 160.2 
Public External Debt, 1982 8041.9 16619.8 1608.5 
Public External Debt% GNP, 1970 14.7 12.9 16.1 
Public External Debt % GNP, 1982 35.8 24.8 44.2 
Growth in Exports, 1960-1970 5.2 2.1 7.6 
Growth in Exports, 1970-1982 2.3 4.5 0.8 
Growth in Imports, 1970-1982 2.1 4.5 0.1 
Note: Economic and size variables from: The World Bank, World Development Report, 1982; Military variables 
from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 
1972-1982, (April 1984). . 
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An examination of the evolution and development of 
arms industries in developing countries is suggestive 
of the type of economic variables that might be used 
to differentiate arms from non arms producers. In · 
general the build up of domestic arms production 
capacities can be considered in terms of seven stages 
(Ayres 1983, pp. 255-259): 
1. arms are imported, but are serviced and main-
tained domestically; 
2. a license to produce arms is acquired and produc-
tion facilities are built requiring huge technical and 
personnel assistance from the supplier; 
3. production starts and to begin with involves local 
assembly of imported sub-assemblies; 
4. the sub-assemblies are assembled locally from 
imported components and sometimes re-exported 
to the licenser; 
5. components are manufactured locally from 
imported raw materials; 
6. local production of raw materials; 
7. complete indigenous production including design, 
raw materials and manufacturing. 
Since military-industrial development appears to 
proceed through a series of evolutionary states, deve-
loping nations will remain dependent on the indus-
trial nations for research and development, materials 
and production technology throughout the early 
stages of armament development. In fact, an exami-
nation of current arms producers indicates that the 
great majority are still in the early stages of develop-
ment where the ability to finance high levels of 
imported technology and components are critical to 
the survival of the industry. 
Structural difficulties and bottlenecks in the econo-
mies of the developing countries hamstring a policy 
of self-sufficiency. As long as domestic arms pro-
duction is based on a weak industriitl base, very 
large investments are required to initiate the design 
and production of the numerous components of 
modem weapon systems. Sub-optimal utilization 
of production capacity characterizes both the late-
comer civil industries and arms production. Tech-
nological specialization leads to investments in 
highly diverse and only partly integrated produc-
tion capacities; the limited demand of the armed 
forces results in over-sized factories and eventually 
substantial cost overruns. While foreign exchange 
requirements might be eased by producing a parti-
cular weapon system rather than import it, it seems 
likely that import of production technology for set-
ting up industrial plants involves a drain on the bal-
ance of payments, which might be higher than the 
original savings (Wulf 1985, p. 341). 
Of the Latin American countries, it appears that 
only Brazil has reached the stage of industrial arms 
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production where large scale imports are no longer 
necessary to sustain indigenous production (Evans 
1986, pp. 103-108; Lock 1986, pp. 70-108; and Perry 
and Weiss 1986, pp. 103-118). 
The nature and evolution of the arms industry, 
therefore suggests that for the vast majority of Latin 
American countries the ability to earn foreign 
exchange (or borrow external funds) may be of prime 
importance in assuring not only adequate resources 
for the initial establishment of the industry but also its 
continued operation through the importation of parts, 
components and raw materials, many of which may 
not be domestically produced. 
Based on these considerations a number of eco-
nomic variables depicting foreign exchange availabil-
ity were selected for the discriminant analysis. From 
the discussion above, it would appear that arms pro-
ducing countries would have to have large and sus-
tained increases in their import capacity to maintain 
and or increase over time their level of indigenous 
arms production. 
The results of the discriminant analysis of our 
sample of Latin American countries3 using different 
measures of size, military and economic variables 
confirm the importance of import capacity in differen-
tiating arms from non arms producers. In fact it is 
apparent that economic variables related to foreign 
exchange availability were necessary and sufficient 
for the correct profiling (Looney and Frederiksen 
1986a) of arms and non arms producers. That is, 
variables relating to size and military related mea-
sures were redundant and did not contribute to the 
profiling of the two groups of countries. In descending 
order (Table 3) the variables that were necessary and 
sufficient to differentiate arms from non arms produc-
ers in Latin America were: 1) growth in exports 1960-
70, b) public external debt 1970, c) growth in imports 
1960-70, d) gross international reserves 1982, and e) 
the current account balance 1970. 
Table 3. Discriminant Analysis Latin American Arms, Non-Arms Producers 
(probability of correct classification) 
Discriminating Variables Discriminating Variables 
I II III IV I II ill IV 
EGA EGA EGA EGA 
EGA PDA PDA GIRB EGA PDA PDA GIRB 
Arms Producer EGA PDA ZA ZA CAA Non Producer EGA · PDA ZA ZA CAA 
Venezuela 96.1 98.7 
Mexico 78.1 100.0 
Brazil 41.8* 100.0 
Ecuador 85.4 57.5 
Colombia 87.4 99.0 
Dominican Republic 00.7 99.8 
Chile 97.2 100.0 
Argentina 71.8 99.5 
Peru 91.4 97.3 
Average 83.2 85.3 
Order Symbol F statistic 
1 EGA 19.7 
2 PDA 14.5 
3 ZA 3.5 
4 GIRB 3.9 
5 CAA 4.4 
Growth exports 1960-1970 
Growth imports 1960-1970 
Growth exports 1970-1982 
Growth inputs 1970-1982 
Public external debt 1970 
Public external debt 1982 
Public external debt % GDP 1970 
Public external debt % GDP 1982 
Gross international reserves 1982 




























Note: *Represents incorrect classification. 
To summarize, the results from the discriminant ana-
lysis suggest that (at least for Latin America): 
1. while size and military expenditures are important 
in determining whether a country produces arms 
or not, these variables are not necessary and suffic-
ient conditions for the establishment of a domestic 
arms industry; 
2. the nature of the arms industry must dictate that a 
Nicaragua 98.5 100.0 100.0 
Honduras 99.4 100.0 100.0 
Costa Rica 98.1 100.0 100.0 
Bolivia 98.3 99.9 100.0 
Guatemala 97.6 100.0 100.0 
El Salvador 74.8 98.9 99.8 
Paraguay 60.2 96.7 98.3 
Panama 99.0 100.0 100.0 
Uruguay 14.5* 37.8* 99.3 
Jamaica 49.8* 94.2 99.7 
Tu.nidad 49.8* 92.7 98.9 
Average 76.2 92.7 98.9 
Variable 
Growth in exports 1960-1970 
Public external debt 1970 
Growth in imports 1960-1970 
Gross international reserves 1982 

























certain economic environment be present for the 
initial profitability of an arms industry and its conti-
nued survival; 
3. continued access to foreign exchange, given the 
nature of the import substitution process charac-
terizing arms industries seems to be the most 
important factor in determining whether or not a 
·country will produce arms. 
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It follows that whether or not arms production will 
significantly expand or not or whether new arms pro-
ducers are established in the near future will depend 
largely on the individual country's ability to generate 
fairly high levels of foreign exchange needed to sup-
port this type of activity. 
One may argue that this quantitative economic 
burden on the balance of payments (i.e., the amount 
of foreign exchange earnings used by the military) is 
minor when compared with the foreign exchange 
need to support higher levels of domestic investment 
and consumption, and that, in any case, indigenous 
defense production would reduce the overall 
amounts of foreign exchange used for military pur-
poses. 
As a basis of comparison, a recent study (Tehral 
1982, pp. 255-259) on the foreign exchange costs of 
the Indian military indicated that, despite the explicit 
long term goal of minimizing the defense claim upon 
foreign exchange earnings in order to further eco-
nomic growth, military claims on foreign exchange 
were certainly not negligible. It appears, for example, 
that total foreign exchange requirements for defense 
were equivalent in value to nearly half of the Indian 
imports of machinery and equipment. During the 
1960-1970 decade, the level of these foreign exchange 
requirements oscillated between 8 per cent and 42 per 
cent of the deficit on the balance of payments with an 
average of about 20 per cent (Tehral 1982, p. 156). 
Similarly, Brzoska (1983, pp. 271-278) has estimated 
that 20-30 % of external public debt of developing 
countries in the late 1970s was due to military related 
imports. 
From the analysis and discussion above it appears 
that the policy goals of: 
1. reducing foreign political dependence through 
non-alignment; 
2. building up a strong defense apparatus; and 
3. minimizing the defense claim upon foreign 
exchange earnings to further economic growth 
prove to be incompatible for third world countries 
in general and Latin America in particular. 
3. Prospects for Future Defense Production in Latin 
America 
The discriminant analysis results discussed above 
indicated that existing Latin American defense pro-
ducers could be largely characterized as countries 
capable of earning or attracting fairly large amounts of 
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foreign exchange, some of which could presumably 
be made available for financing and servicing a fairly 
foreign-input-intensive defense industry. Given the 
nature of the defense industry, there is little reason to 
believe that it will become less foreign exchange 
intensive in the near future. It follows, therefore, that 
potential producers of military equipment must be 
those countries who also have the ability to finance a 
large volume of imports for a fairly long and sustained 
time interval. 
Based on the following brief survey of the debt/ 
export potential of the region, it appears very unlikely 
that any new significant arms producer will be estab-
lished in the region in the foreseeable future. 
In fact, since 1981, Latin America as a whole, has 
been facing its worst economic and financial crisis 
since the depression of the 1930s. This crisis is 
marked by reduced production, exacerbated by the 
overall slowdown in the world economy in the first 
part of the 1980s, increased unemployment and the 
consequent waste of the economic potential of the 
countries of the region. In addition domestic inflation 
has accelerated in most of the Latin American coun-
tries, reaching its highest rate in the last three decades. 
In general the balance of payments position for most 
countries in the region are moving toward surplus 
simply because oflack of finance to increase imports, 
rather than any dramatic increase in over-all export 
earnings. 
In fact the consensus based on the analysis of the 
leading international agencies (United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America, 1982; Inter-
American Development Bank, 1984; and The Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 1985) appears to be that the 
most burdensome aspect and, at the same time the 
primary cause of the current economic crisis, is the 
foreign debt problem. In many countries of the 
region, the growing costs of interest and amortization 
of foreign debt absorb a high proportion of the exter-
nal payments capacity, virtually eliminating the possi-
bility of development. In some cases, domestic ad-
justment measures have had to be taken, and special 
external resources have had to be mobilized to deal 
with the emergency situation (Kuczynski 1982/83, 
1983). 
But it is not the growth in the volume of the debt by 
itself that has brought on external problems; it is 
rather the deterioration in the debt structure and in 
the terms of interest and maturities which, in certain 
circumstances may place an excessive burden on the 
economies of the debtor countries (Cline 1982/83, p. 
111). 
. i 
In as much as external credit-worthiness is one of 
the principal factors limiting economic growth, two 
critical aspects of this process are the ability of the 
debtor countries to earn foreign exchange - through 
expansion of exports and or substitution of imports 
and the evolution of the world economy and internati-
onal trade. From that point of view, external borrow-
ing policy will have to be based on strict compliance of 
conditions of efficiency and financial compatibility in 
the use of external credit. Any diversion of resources 
to unproductive purposes or an excessive dose of 
short and medium term credit on the part of these 
countries will intensify the vulnerability of the bal-
ance of payments to an eventual liquidity crisis, parti-
cipated by for example a drop in exports, a contrac-
tion in capital flows, or a deterioration in the terms of 
trade. 
To understand the current situation and future pro-
spects for the region, it is useful to break recent Latin 
American growth-debt patterns down into three sig-
nificantly different phases of economic development 
(Inter-American Development Bank, 1984). In the 
first phase, from 1960-1974, a deliberate policy of 
accelerated economic growth prevailed, based on the 
dynamic expansion of private and public investment, 
increased domestic savings and the contribution of a 
modest, but significant amount of external savings. 
The region's total gross domestic product expe-
rienced accelerated growth, with the average rate 
moving from 5 .5 per cent in 1961-69 to 7 .3 per cent in 
1970-74. During this period, the external financing 
received showed a relatively balanced structure, with 
42 per cent coming from official credits, 27 per cent 
from private credits and 31 per cent contributed by 
private capital in the form of direct investments. The 
financing terms for external credits were in general 
appropriate to the external payments capacity of the 
countries and the nature of the investment programs 
supported This made it possible to maintain the 
foreign debt service at a relatively stable level of about 
15 per cent of current export earnings. 
The situation changed dramatically in 197 4, when a 
slower economic growth trend - but still significantly 
than in the industrialized countries, became evident. 
The reduction in growth was combined with increas-
ing balance of payments deficits and an elastic and 
unconditional supply of international private credit. 
This second stage of the Latin American economic 
experience, which extended to about 1980 was cha-
racterized by an expansionist policy of public and 
private consumption expenditures, moderate and 
irregular growth in fixed capital formation and an 
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increase in exports. The surplus of domestic demand 
over gross domestic product and its counterpart, the 
current account deficit of the balance of payments was 
sustained by easy access to international credit. 
In the third phase, which began between 1981 and 
1982, most Latin American countries adopted adjust-
ment and stabilizatjon policies designed to reduce 
domestic spending and curb the balance of payments 
deficit (Williamson 1983). Data presented by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (1984) show that 
the reduction in investment expenditures in 1982 and 
1983 exceeded the drop in consumption and was a 
major factor in bringing about the decline of gross 
domestic product in those two years. The reduction in 
imports resulting from the adjustment policies gene-
rated a growing trade surplus, and substantially 
reduced the current account deficit in the balance of 
payments in 1982 and 1983. However, serious reser-
vations (Balogh 1982; Girvan, Bernal and Hughes 
1980) have been expressed about the significance and 
effectiveness of these adjustment policies, particu-
larly regarding their effects on the incipient economic 
recovery of the industrialized countries. In general, 
such reservations emphasize the practical impossibil-
ity of all countries successfully attaining the objective 
ofincreasing their exports and at the same time reduc-
ing their imports. 
With this background and in terms of the future, a 
series of detailed forecasts for the region up to 1990 
have been undertaken by the Inter American Deve-
lopment Bank (1984b). 
Under alternative economic growth scenarios pro-
duced by the Bank, it would appear that interest on 
foreign debt will continue to be a heavy burden on 
export income and the main determinant of the cur-
rent account deficit in the balance of payments. 
For example, under a low growth scenario, with a 
gross domestic product increase of about 2. 7 per cent 
per year (equivalent to population growth) and 
expansion of the region's exports at a rate of about 11 
per cent a year - the prospects are relatively favorable . 
In this scenario, the drain on export earnings caused 
by the debt interest payments tends to decline. The 
projected economic picture assumes the continuation 
of disciplined public and private expenditure policies 
that will make it possible to maintain a moderate 
import growth which, together with a vigorous expan-
sion in exports, would lead to an increased foreign 
trade surplus. The Bank's simulation exercise shows, 
however, that the growing trade surplus would reach 
.the level of interest payments only at the end of this 
decade. If, in addition, a low foreign debt growth rate 
L 
of 4 per cent annually is attained, the net transfer of 
foreign savings received by the region would continue 
to be negative and growing in the upcoming years. 
Certainly, the rate of growth of real imports would. in 
no way approach the levels reached by the arms pro-
ducers in the 1970-82 period. 
Under the alternative scenario of a 5.4 per cent 
annual economic growth rate and with the same con-
ditions of export expansion assumed in the previous 
scenario, imports would rise faster, and the trade sur-
plus would decline. The viability of this growth scena-
rio depends, among other things on the unlikely pos-
sibility of the Latin American countries being able to 
attract a growing net external financing estimated at 
$73 billion toward the end of the decade (which 
would be more than double the net disbursement of 
foreign loans in 1982). 
Again given the fact that the non-military produc-
ing countries already have a higher debt burden 
(Table 1) in terms of external debUGNP, it seems 
highly unlikely that major inflows of external funds 
will be directed to any of the members of this group of 
countries, especially if one of the intended uses of the 
additional inflow of funds was to establish a domestic 
armament industry. 
In summary, analysis of the process by which 
foreign debt has accumulated in Latin America indi-
cates clearly the constraints imposed by foreign debt 
on the prospects for the region's economic develop-
ment Even under conditions oflow economic growth 
assumed in the first scenario, the foreign exchange 
earnings generated by exports would only cover inter-
est payments and imports of consumer goods and 
intermediate inputs. The cost of merchandise and 
capital imports would have to be supported by the 
new inflow of external savings. All of this also 
assumes that the international finans;ial community 
will respond favorably to the need for long time refi-
nancing of debts maturing in the coming years, a 
rather heroic assumption given the existing near 
default position of most of the countries in the region. 
4. Conclusions - Implications 
The main conclusions together with their implica-
tions of the analysis above is that: 
1. whether a country in Latin America is or is not a 
producer of at least one major weapons system can 
be explained largely by the economic environment 
of that country; 
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2. access for foreign exchange to finance a relatively 
high rate of growth of imports appears to be-a major 
determinant of whether or not a country will be a 
military producer~ 
3. based on the evolution of the current debt situation 
and the export prospects for the region, it is highly 
unlikely that any individual country (either an 
existing producer or non-producer of armaments) 
will be able to finance imports on the scale expe-
rienced in the 1970-82 period, at least for the rest of 
this decade; 
4. reinforcing this general trend towards austerity and 
reduced import capacity is the fact that the non-
military producer countries in Latin America are 
also those countries who appear to have less access 
to foreign exchange due to poor export prospects 
and or higher debt service burdens; 
5. it follows that we can anticipate no new Latin Ame-
rican arms producers, at least for the period up to 
1990, and most likely for some years later. 
Notes 
1. Others are: Wtlfetal (1980), Harkavy (1975), and 
Peleg (1980). Recently, a number of excellent case 
studies and country analyses have appeared. See 
for example the essays in: Tuomi and Vayrynen 
(1983), Ball and Leitenberg (1983), Brzoska and 
Ohlson (1986), and Katz (1984 and 1986). 
2. Here producers are defined as those countries pro-
ducing at least one major weapons system (Neu-
man 1984, p. 175). Obviously this is somewhat 
arbitrary, but this definition is essentially the same 
as that used by Wulf (1985, pp. 332-335). 
3. Country economic data were taken from the World 
Bank (1984, 1985 and 1986); Military variables 
were taken from the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (1987). 
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